L40 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: GeneralReturn

This paper examines the role of structural change in the asymmetric adjustment of retail energy prices following changes in crude oil costs. The paper also examines the pattern of adjustment in retail energy prices when exchange rate is accounted for as part of the marginal cost of importing crude oil in European countries with high oil import dependency ratio. The paper shows that the results of Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin (2013) no longer hold when the structural change in the relationship between retail energy prices and crude oil costs is taken into the consideration. The paper also cautions that studies like Kristoufek and Lunackova (2014) that failed to account for exchange rate as part of the marginal cost of importing oil for countries with high oil import dependency ratio may be misleading. In fact, the results of this paper further indicate that once the exchange rate effect is taken into consideration, the possibility of rent-seeking behaviour in the gasoline markets of Italy and Spain disappears; while the rockets and feathers effect observed in most of the ex-tax gasoline, diesel, domestic heating oil and industrial fuel oil markets vanishes.

In this paper, we assess the effects of the investigations carried by the Turkish Competition Board in 1997, 2002 and 2003 on the degree competition in the Turkish cement market. For this aim, we used proverbial Bresnahan-Lau framework with alternative definitions for the supply relation. Our first finding is that cement producers had a considerable amount of market power at the period prior to the first investigation in 1997. In addition, this study shows that, parallel to our initial expectation, competition in the cement market increased thanks to the investigations. The positive effect of the first investigation is found to be especially significant. Hence, this study witnesses that the enforcement of the competition law by the Turkish Competition Board has produced the desired effects in the most problematic sector with respect to competition law.

We compare different combinations of technology and antitrust policies from a social welfare point of view in a non-tournament model of cost reducing R&D with spillovers, for the case of a homogeneous goods duopoly, where production produces pollution as a by-product, firms face an exogenous emissions tax and can also invest in abatement technologies. We show that for sufficiently polluting industries facing a loose environmental policy, cooperative R&D is not always welfare improving; a policy of subsidizing cooperative R&D is always welfare improving; allowing for mergers may be socially desirable; not regulating the industry at all may be welfare superior to a policy consisting of forbidding market collusion and subsidizing cooperative R&D.