L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social EntrepreneurshipNávrat zpět
Výsledky 1 až 2 z 2:
Selected Socioeconomic Determinants of the Size of the Nonprofit Sector Serving Households in the OECD CountriesJindřich Špička, Markéta Arltová, Petr BoukalPrague Economic Papers 2019, 28(3):276-295 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.671 The article investigates the differences in socioeconomic determinants of the size of the nonprofit sector serving households in the wealthy and less wealthy OECD countries. Based on panel data modelling of 22 wealthy OECD countries and 17 less wealthy OECD countries in the long-term period 2000-2014, authors revealed distinctive determinants of the size of the nonprofit sector serving households in the wealthy and less wealthy countries. The model identified GDP per capita, government health care expenditures per capita, number of refugees per hundred thousand inhabitants and unemployment rate as significant long-term determinants of the size of the nonprofit sector in the wealthy OECD countries. Alternatively, GDP per capita, age and educational structure are significant long-term determinants of the size of the nonprofit sector in the less wealthy OECD countries. Authors found opposing effect of GDP per capita on the size the nonprofit sector between the two groups of countries. |
Certification and Its Impact on Quality of CharitiesKatarína SvítkováPrague Economic Papers 2013, 22(4):542-557 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.467 Nonprofit organizations in transition countries experience low trust and consequently low income from donations. The study introduces one particular solution to the problem, certification, and examines its impact on the quality of the nonprofit organizations in the market. The situation is illustrated in a game theoretical model, with a manager, donor, certifier, and the charity providing a charitable good: for simplicity, charity is either good or bad: A good charity spends all the resources on the charitable good, and a bad one diverts all resources to the private consumption of its manager (for-profit in disguise). We show that for a wide parameter range and for two different disclosure rules, the presence of a certifier in the market increases the incentives for managers to choose good charities, leading to an improvement in the market as the share of good charities increases. |