F34 - International Lending and Debt ProblemsReturn

The influence of foreign banks on a host country's lending depends on several factors, including the policy of the parent bank, the strategy of entry, economic cycles in the home country and abroad, growth prospects, the indebtedness of commitments and the capital adequacy of the parent bank. During the most recent economic crisis, the credit supply of foreign banks in the 10 new European Union (EU) Member States has not remained stable in the crisis. More specifically, we find evidence that foreign banks have cut the credit supply slightly in the new EU Member States.

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the current crisis of the eurozone. The irst part explains why the eurozone is not an optimum currency area. The second part points out that euro is an intensiier of the business cycle. The third part examines the Greek crisis. The fourth part explains the inner tensions in the eurozone. The ifth part asks whether euro is suitable for the countries of Central and East Europe. The sixth part examines the debt crisis within the eurozone.

The paper focuses on net external assets (NEA) in developed and transition countries in 1995, 2000, and 2005. The net international investment position is used as the main NEA indicator. In addition, alternative NEA estimates for developed countries are based on the cumulated current account, the cumulated financial and capital accounts, and the net factor income from abroad. The NEA estimates are divided by the gross domestic product (GDP) based on the U.S. dollar exchange rate. We identify the most important net creditors and net debtors, for which we study the average behavior of the real product growth, the unemployment rate, and the inflation rate among developed countries. We conclude that all the given estimates of NEA are good but imperfect.

In this paper I study the main determinants of successful reaccess to international capital markets on a set of emerging market countries after a financial crisis. I focus on three components of the reaccess strategy: commitment to pay, ability to pay, and global liquidity. I employ a panel of 49 countries over a nearly 30-year period and apply a simple probit approach to show that, indeed, a sound external position and a sustainable debt profile, accompanied by a favorable global liquidity environment, are the key considerations for creditors considering whether to resume lending.

Since the mid-1990s, the IMF has provided large financial assistance to a number of member countries affected by serious financial and exchange rate crises. Because of the unprecedented size of these packages and possible negative side effects, the desirability of such assistance has become a hotly discussed issue. A consensus is now forming that official lending to country in crisis should not cease completely, but at the same time, official funds cannot be expected to fill in any existing financing gap. The article evaluates the risk of moral hazard connected with IMF lending. Although the substantial assistance inevitably influences the behavior and expectations of all players, there is little support for argument that lending created serious moral hazard. The role of the IMF conditionality as the traditional tool of reducing moral hazard is described in the circumstances of the new capital account developments.