D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; CorruptionReturn

In this article, corruption is treated as an expression of human entrepreneurship, which does not fully fit in the commonly accepted moral and legal standards. Despite being negatively perceived, it is persistently present in the public, economic and political life of every country as evidenced by a number of press releases on corruption.
Research literature analysis reveals the existence of two conflicting opinions with regard to the way in which corruption affects innovative activity of companies and economic growth. The more morally correct theory, which can be dubbed the sand-the-wheels theory, assumes that corruption negatively influences innovative activity and economic growth. Whereas, the grease-the-wheels theory, which is inconsistent with the principles of social responsibility of business, argues for the positive influence of corruption on innovative activity of companies and economic growth. This article is a voice in that discussion.

This paper mainly discusses the effects of media capture on local government accountability in undemocratic countries. Firstly, we construct the models with and without media capture from the perspective of incentive theory. Secondly, we conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes with and without media capture. The analysis shows that no media capture decreases the local official's equilibrium efficiency wage under whatever conditions, and at the same time makes the central government's constraint to incentivize the local official to exert effort easier to be satisfied under some conditions, while harder to be satisfied under other conditions.

Economic theories of the last decades provide analytical framework within which we can explain institutional conditions for corrupt action. Specialists making economic policy recommendations to resolve this problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are rent seeking and agency theories. In this paper, I explain economic policy recommendations that stem out of both approaches. I argue that scholars suggesting these recommendations within these two frameworks do not understand each other because of different assumptions they make. More specifically, I show that two sets of policy recommendations presented here are based on the particular system of property rights assumed within each theory. In this example, I show why corruption is a problem of the state rather than the market.

Corruption and corruptibility - due to their illegal and therefore secretive nature - are difficult to be assessed either with traditional tools, such as hard data on criminal convictions or soft data elicited through opinion polls, questionnaires, or case studies. While there seems to be agreement nowadays that corruption does have a negative impact on (foreign) private investment and growth, government revenue and infrastructure, and social equality, and while there seems to be evidence that low economic development, federal structure and short histories of experience with democracy and free trade all favour corruption on the macro-level, it is poorly understood what exactly, on the micro-level, the determinants of corruptibility are and what institutional arrangements could be used to fight (the causes of) corruption. In this article we review a third, complementary mode of investigation of corruption and corruptibility: experiments. We assess their strengths and weaknesses, and identify areas where they could be particularly useful in guiding policy choices - namely in designing incentive-compatible and effective anti-corruption measures in public procurement.

This paper develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of transformation of the service sector during privatization process. A simple model which includes a supplier of services and retail firms is presented and applied to study the effects of various sequences of privatization. Our findings indicate that privatizing the supplier first is always at least as good as privatizing the retailers first because (unlike the strategy of privatizing the retail firms first) it increases both the number of retail firms and profit of the supplier.