D43 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionReturn

In this paper, we assess the effects of the investigations carried by the Turkish Competition Board in 1997, 2002 and 2003 on the degree competition in the Turkish cement market. For this aim, we used proverbial Bresnahan-Lau framework with alternative definitions for the supply relation. Our first finding is that cement producers had a considerable amount of market power at the period prior to the first investigation in 1997. In addition, this study shows that, parallel to our initial expectation, competition in the cement market increased thanks to the investigations. The positive effect of the first investigation is found to be especially significant. Hence, this study witnesses that the enforcement of the competition law by the Turkish Competition Board has produced the desired effects in the most problematic sector with respect to competition law.

In transition countries, especially in the period of central planning or semi-command regulation, prices of goods and services in the non-tradable sector were regulated, which was one of the main obstacles to normal functioning of the supply-demand market mechanism after the breakdown of the socialist economic system. In the period of economic transition reestablishment of market institutions arises, with price deregulation as one of the fundamental constitutional parts of this process. But in the case of transition economies there exists a recognized doubt in an immediately well functioning market system after deregulation because of inadequate development of the economic system in the past that produced a gap in the development of institutions typical for market economies. The aim of this article is to present the results of the empirical analysis on the market outcomes of price deregulation for chimney sweep services in the Slovenian economy. For this purpose we developed an original model for analysing market outcomes after price deregulation occurs. For the selected case study we recognize large cumulative price growth, that was a consequence of significant supply-side imperfection, since the selection among suppliers is based on the concession system at the municipality level.