Prague Economic Papers 2009, 18(3):267-282 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.354

Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers

Jérôme Ballet1, Philippe Meral2, Dawidson Razafimahatolotra3
1 University of Versailles Saint Quentin en Yvelines, France (jballetfr@yahoo.fr).
2 University of Versailles Saint Quentin en Yvelines, France.
3 University of Antananarivo, Madagascar.

Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative efficiency of transfers in kind vis-à-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach - to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to figure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less efficient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.

Keywords: altruism, transfer, paternalism
JEL classification: D64

Published: January 1, 2009  Show citation

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Ballet, J., Meral, P., & Razafimahatolotra, D. (2009). Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers. Prague Economic Papers, 18(3), 267-282. doi: 10.18267/j.pep.354
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