Prague Economic Papers 2008, 17(3):254-275 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.333

Towards measurement of political pressure on central banks: the case of the central bank of egypt

Ibrahim L. Awad
Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (ibrahim@fsv.cuni.cz).

This paper assesses whether the legal independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) by the latest legislation promulgated in 2005 is factual. The author followed Fry's methodology, which assumes that the level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal attributes. In an attempt to develop Fry's method, there was used a simple criterion to assess the central bank's independence, namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply target without squeezing the private sector. Applying this criterion to the case of the CBE, we find that the legal independence granted to the CBE by the latest legislation is not factual.

Klíčová slova: central bank independence, fiscal dominance, political pressure
JEL classification: C23, E51, E59, H75

Zveřejněno: 1. leden 2008  Zobrazit citaci

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Awad, I.L. (2008). Towards measurement of political pressure on central banks: the case of the central bank of egypt. Prague Economic Papers, 17(3), 254-275. doi: 10.18267/j.pep.333
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