Prague Economic Papers 2004, 13(3):217-236 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.240

Voting Power Indicators in the European Union

Marek Loužek
Center for Economics and Politics, Politických vězňů 10, CZ - 110 00 Prague 1 and University of Economics, 4, W. Churchill Sq., CZ - 130 67 Prague 3 (e-mail: louzek@post.cz).

The article is concerned with voting power indicators in the European Union and one paradox arising from them. The first chapter defines voting power indicators exactly. The second chapter defines the paradox of new members and introduces some examples. The third chapter specifies data - voting power indicators in the EU. The fourth chapter computes differences between old and new voting power indicators. The fifth chapter summarizes the frequency of the paradox of new members in total. The sixth chapter brings a conclusion.

Keywords: EU enlargement, voting indicator, index of power, minimal winning coalitions, game theory, quantitative analysis
JEL classification: C12, C43

Published: January 1, 2004  Show citation

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Loužek, M. (2004). Voting Power Indicators in the European Union. Prague Economic Papers, 13(3), 217-236. doi: 10.18267/j.pep.240
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