Prague Economic Papers 2000, 9(3) | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.83

Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information

Karel Janda

Imperfect information in the monopolistic credit market could lead to the rejection of credit provision to some applicants for credit. The choice of which class of borrowers is rejected credit depends on the relations among some characteristics of borrowers. The inefficiency of credit market could be alleviated by government credit guarantees.

Keywords: credit, monopoly, imperfect information

Published: January 1, 2000  Show citation

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Janda, K. (2000). Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information. Prague Economic Papers, 9(3), . doi: 10.18267/j.pep.83
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