Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)

doi:10.18267/j.pep.61

Prague Economic Papers 2000, 9(1) | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.61

Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)

Wladimir Andreff

The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition.

Klíčová slova: privatization, corporate governance, transition countries, state regulation, criminal or non legal activities

Zveřejněno: 1. leden 2000 Zobrazit citaci

Andreff, W. (2000). Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries). Prague Economic Papers, 9(1), . doi: 10.18267/j.pep.61

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